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Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of deregulation on the banking industry in an emerging 
economy using profit-based measures of performance. Using panel data of 83 Indian 
banks belonging to different ownership groups for the period 1986 to 2005, we find that 
profit efficiency and productivity declined following deregulation. While public sector 
banks performed better than private banks in the pre-deregulation period, there was no 
difference in their performances after deregulation. Foreign and new private banks turned 
out to have the highest levels of profit productivity. Our results are in contrast with the 
findings of previous studies that have found significant improvements in efficiency and 
productivity of Indian banks using cost-based measures of performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The banking industry, in many economies, has witnessed substantial deregulation from 
government control especially during the eighties. The impact of deregulation on the 
performance of banks has been widely studied.
1
 However the evidence emerging from a 
variety of such studies is mixed. For the USA, it has been found that after deregulation, 
although cost productivity declined, profit productivity increased as a result of 
improvement in the quality of output (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Berger and Mester, 
2003). For some other countries, deregulation was not necessarily associated with 
improvement in efficiency and productivity, e.g. Spain (Lozano-Vivas, 1998; Kumbhakar 
et al., 2001) and Portugal (Mendes and Rebelo, 1999). On the other hand, banking sector 
reforms yielded positive results in Norway (Berg et al., 1993), Taiwan (Chen, 2001), 
Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998) etc. 
Most of the existing studies pertain to developed economies and evidence for 
developing economies is few and far between. The few studies that exist for developing 
economies have mostly concentrated on estimating either technical efficiency or total 
factor productivity (TFP) or cost efficiency of banks, based on their production or cost 
functions. In the banking literature it is increasingly being argued that profit 
maximization under certain circumstances may be a better specification than cost 
minimization (Berger and Mester, 2003). Banks may undertake costly ventures in order 
to benefit in terms of profits. Cost measures may identify such banks as inefficient 
whereas profit measures may term them as good performers. Accordingly in this paper 
we assess the performance of Indian banks in terms of profit efficiency and profit 
productivity, and examine the effects of deregulation on performance. 
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Among the few studies that have analyzed bank performance in India, our results 
are compared and contrasted specifically with two papers. Kumbhakar and Sarkar 
(2003a), employing a generalized shadow cost function approach with data for the period 
1986 to 1997, found that TFP of Indian banks has increased subsequent to deregulation. 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b), using the technique of stochastic frontier analysis with 
data for the period 1986 to 2000, observed a rise in cost efficiency. Both these studies 
found that private banks performed better than the state owned public banks. It would be 
instructive to complement these results by studying profit performance of Indian banks 
during this period. The present paper seeks to provide evidence in this direction with an 
updated data set. 
There are some other studies of bank performance in the Indian context, but either 
their data period is insufficient to study the full impact of deregulation which was 
initiated in 1992
2
 or the econometric methodology does not adequately measure 
performance.
3
 More recently, Shanmugam and Das (2004) used a larger data set to 
estimate efficiency of Indian banks using various stochastic frontiers. But they too did not 
study profit performance of banks. 
In this paper, based on data for the period 1986 to 2005, our main finding is that 
performance of Indian banks has declined in terms of profit productivity. This result is in 
contrast with findings from developed economies. For instance, in the case of USA it has 
been observed that cost productivity declined and profit productivity improved during the 
period of deregulation (Berger and Mester, 2003). We argue that in the case of a 
developed economy, the markets and business models were already in an advanced state 
of maturity and development. Hence deregulation of controls unleashed the existing 
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potential in banks to innovate, invest in new technology and offer services of superior 
quality, thereby improving their profit performance while suffering losses on the cost side 
due to the additional operating expenditure incurred. However in the case of a developing 
economy such as India, we expect that deregulation (characterized by freeing up of 
controls on pricing, expansion, entry etc.) would result in lowering of costs due to 
adoption of efficient technology but also put a pressure on profits due to the 
intensification of competition.
4
 Our findings are in line with this expectation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
regulatory changes in Indian banking. Section 3 discusses the stochastic frontier 
methodology we employ. Section 4 presents the data used in the paper and formalizes the 
econometric specification. Section 5 and Section 6 are devoted to discussions of the 
results from the analysis of efficiency and productivity, respectively. Section 7 presents a 
comparison of our profit based results with the cost based results available in the 
literature. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Regulatory Changes in Indian Banking 
Indian banking industry is characterized by the co-existence of state owned public banks, 
private banks (incumbents and entrants) and foreign banks. Prior to deregulation, Indian 
banking was a highly controlled industry. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) initiated 
banking sector reforms on the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee on 
Financial Sector Reforms (submitted in 1991). The first set of reforms in 1992-1993 
included entry deregulation (leading to entry of new private banks), branch de-licensing 
and deregulation of interest rates. Public banks were for the first time permitted to raise 
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up to 49 % of equity from the capital market thereby encouraging them to become market 
oriented. Capital adequacy norms of a minimum 8 % Capital to Risk-weighted Assets 
Ratio (CRAR) were imposed and stringent income recognition and provisioning norms 
were introduced in 1993. Statutory pre-emptions were reduced in several stages, e.g. the 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) requirement was brought down from 38.5 % in 1991 to 
25 % and Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) requirement from 7.50 % in 1991 to 5 % in 2005. 
Subsequently, in the backdrop of the Basel Committee recommendations and the 
Asian financial crises, the report of the Second Narasimham Committee (submitted in 
1998) paved the way for the „second generation reforms‟ in the Indian banking industry. 
The Committee‟s recommendations led to prudential measures like higher CRAR (9 % 
with effect from March 31, 2000), allowing for market risk on government securities, 
stricter Non-Performing Assets (NPAs henceforth) norms, introduction of Assets-
Liabilities management and Risk management guidelines. More recent changes in Indian 
banking include legislation for NPA recovery and setting up of Debt Recovery Tribunals 
in 2002, introduction of risk based supervision in 2003 and RBI‟s issuing guidelines for 
mergers of private banks and identifying a road-map for entry of foreign banks in 2005. 
The banking sector reforms in India, initiated in 1992, freed up the industry from 
a lot of controls and offered a level playing field to all bank groups. While, the increase 
in operational freedom is expected to have improved productivity of all bank groups, the 
intensification of competition could have put pressure on profitability. Therefore it can be 
expected that even though cost efficiency and productivity of banks would have increased, 
but bank performance in terms of profit measures may have declined. As regards the 
relative performance of public and private banks, while private ownership is theoretically 
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associated with superior performance, the public banks in India enjoyed state support till 
the deregulation of the industry. After deregulation, the public banks received less state 
support but became more market oriented. Hence it is difficult to form a priori 
expectations about the relative performance of public and private banks. On the other 
hand, foreign banks with their costly practices may not have been profit efficient but the 
new private banks that started operations only after deregulation can be expected to have 
shown high growth. 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
The disadvantages of employing standard regression methodology to bank performance 
studies have been widely documented (see e.g. Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Since 
banking industry is characterized by a lot of variation, frontier analysis offers a useful 
way to assess the relative performance of the banks. In this paper, we use the parametric 
approach of Stochastic Frontier Analysis which allows for error in the data owing to luck, 
data problems, or other measurement errors.
5
 This technique allows us to examine the 
performance of individual banks relative to a frontier that is estimated based on the 
production, cost or profit functions. Banking being a multi-product industry poses 
difficulties in estimation of a production frontier. Hence we are left with the choice 
between a cost and a profit frontier. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) noted that the majority of efficiency and 
productivity studies in banking have focused on the cost function while the revenue side 
has been relatively less researched. Recent studies in banking have started focusing on 
profit based approaches (Berger and Mester, 1997, 2003; Williams and Gardener, 2003; 
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Maudos and Pastor, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Pastor and Serrano, 2005). Berger 
and Mester (2003) argue that profit maximization hypothesis may better describe the 
economic goals of managers and owners of a bank, who take into account revenues as 
well as costs while taking decisions. Banks might often want to incur additional expenses, 
because they want to concentrate on attracting high quality personnel and on making 
investment in high cost capital, in order to improve the quality of their products and 
services. Since quality is difficult to measure, failure to account for the quality of output 
implies that such costs will show up as cost inefficiency. Thus the profit efficiency or 
productivity of these banks may be higher than the same measures in terms of cost. This 
is referred to as the „quality hypothesis‟ (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
It cannot be unambiguously asserted whether Indian banks follow a cost 
minimization or profit maximization objective and it may be argued that the banking 
industry has features of both these hypotheses. Subsequent to deregulation, even public 
banks have become profit conscious as government support through recapitalization has 
come down considerably and these banks are accessing the capital markets for funds. 
This necessitates the presence of a healthy balance sheet. Thus public banks are actively 
competing with their private counterparts in increasing earnings by attracting customers 
and marketing innovative products, especially in the retail segment. Therefore it would be 
appropriate to appraise performance of Indian banks under the profit maximization 
hypothesis. 
There are two models of profit function in the banking literature. The standard 
profit function assumes that banks maximize profit choosing the levels of output, while 
prices of output and input are given. When it is difficult to estimate the standard profit 
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function, researchers take recourse to the alternative profit function (Berger and Mester, 
1997; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997) that assumes that banks maximize profit choosing 
output prices, while output levels are constrained.
6
 It has been widely found that results 
obtained from alternative profit function are very close to those obtained from standard 
profit function (Kumbhakar et al., 2001; Berger and Mester, 2003). 
We adopt the alternative profit function for the efficiency and productivity 
analysis in this paper.
7
 Growth in the local economies in India is likely to determine the 
extent of deposit mobilization or lending by a bank. Hence a bank may face a constraint 
on the output side as it may not be possible to change its output quickly, either through 
change in size of the portfolio or number of branches. But there may be some amount of 
flexibility in choosing output prices resulting from gradual deregulation of interest rates. 
Banks in India are free to choose all interest rates other than those on saving deposits and 
small loans. Furthermore, the banking market structure may be characterized neither by 
full monopoly nor by perfect price competition. This imperfect competition in prices can 
be best captured by an alternative profit function whereby banks facing an output 
constraint choose prices to maximize profits. Moreover, the standard profit function 
requires one to have good data on prices of outputs which is difficult to obtain. To 
overcome this, often empirical studies use imperfect measures for output prices that can 
introduce measurement errors in the analysis. In the alternative profit function, prices are 
choice variables and the profit function depends on output levels which are not only easy 
to obtain, but also cleanly measured. Based on these reasons, we adopt the alternative 
profit function to study efficiency and productivity of Indian banks. 
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Following the stochastic frontier methodology of Battese and Coelli (1995), the 
frontier based on the alternative profit function can be specified as follows: 
 it = f (Y it , W it ) - U it  + V it  ---- (1) 
where  it  is profit, Y is the output vector and W is the vector of factor prices (all 
variables are measured in logarithms);the Vit are random variables which are assumed to 
be iid N(0, 
2
V ), and independent of the random variables Uit which account for technical 
inefficiency and are assumed to be independently distributed as non-negative truncations 
of the N( it,
2
U ) distribution, such that:  
           ititit ZU    
where, Zit is an 1xp vector of variables which may influence inefficiency; δ is a px1 
vector of parameters to be estimated; and it  are random variables, defined by the 
truncations of N(0, 
2
V ) such that the point of truncation is itZ . The parameterization 
from Battese and Corra (1977) is used, replacing 
2
V  and 
2
U  with 
222
UVS    
and
22 / SU   . The i
th
 bank‟s profit efficiency relative to the profit frontier is estimated 
as PEit = exp (-Uit). 
 
4. Data and Econometric Specification 
For selecting the bank‟s output vector, we follow the value added approach (Grifell-Tatje 
and Lovell, 1996; Berg et al., 1993) that treats both deposits and loans as output.
8
 Thus, 
our output vector consists of value of fixed deposits (FD), saving deposits (SD), current 
deposits (CD), investments (INV) and loans and advances (ADV). Apart from these, we 
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also include the number of branches (B) as an output variable.
9
 This is considered 
important as the number of branches can proxy for the quality of services (Berg et al., 
1993; Kumbhakar et al., 2001). The number of branches also proxies for the size of the 
bank‟s transactions which in the absence of data on the number of deposit and loan 
accounts is a better way of adopting the value added approach (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell; 
1996). 
Labour (L) and Physical Capital (K) are the two variable inputs. The dependent 
variable is net profit (π).10 Price of labour (wL) is obtained by dividing total establishment 
expenses (salaries and benefits) by total number of employees. Price of capital (wK) is 
obtained by dividing the total expenditure on physical capital by total fixed assets. All 
nominal variables are converted to real by measuring them at 1993-94 prices. The data 
are taken from various issues of Financial Analysis of Banks and Performance Highlights 
of Banks published by the Indian Banks‟ Association. We analyze data on 83 banks for 
20 years over the period 1986 to 2005. In all, there were 27 public banks, 25 domestic 
private sector banks (private banks, henceforth), 22 foreign banks, and 9 new domestic 
private sector banks (new private banks, henceforth) in our data set. However, we have 
an unbalanced panel because not all banks (other than public banks) operated throughout 
the period and data for some banks were not available in some periods. The minimum 
number of banks in any year was 16 for private banks (in 2004), 8 for foreign banks (in 
1996) and 6 for new private banks (in 2005). This left us with a sample of 1362 
observations. New private banks are the only entrants in this study and since they started 
operating after deregulation, their data were available only from 1996.
11
 Table 1 presents 
the group-wise means of the key variables used in our study for five different years from 
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our data-set. From this table, it is evident that public banks were the most important 
constituents of the industry although new private banks appear to have expanded quite 
rapidly after their entry. 
We differ from existing studies on Indian banking based on the stochastic frontier 
approach (e.g. Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003a; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003b; 
Shanmugam and Das, 2004) in several ways. First, we estimate a stochastic profit frontier 
from which we obtain profit efficiency. Second, we include both foreign and new private 
(entrants) sector as separate groups in the analysis. This allows us to take a closer look at 
the comparative role of competition and ownership. Third, we examine the role of size in 
determining efficiency. Fourth, we consider each category of deposit separately in the 
output vector. Fifth, we study profit productivity by combining estimates of technical 
progress and efficiency growth. 
Finally it is noteworthy that very few existing studies have attempted to study 
performance of Indian banking using profit based measures, e.g. Sarkar, Sarkar and 
Bhaumik (1998); Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) and Koeva (2003). All of these studies 
have used profitability indicators like return on assets and operating profit ratio as 
dependent variables in regressions involving a host of explanatory variables and 
ownership dummies. We have argued earlier that regression analysis is not an appropriate 
technique in the context of the bank performance. So far as we are aware, this is the first 
study that uses a stochastic profit frontier to study profit efficiency and profit productivity 
of Indian banks. 
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We adopt the translog form as our specification for (1) since it provides sufficient 
flexibility to a parametric function while maintaining parsimony of parameters (unlike 
the fourier flexible function). The translog function in our case takes the following form: 
  
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Following Berger and Mester (2003), we impose parametric restrictions for 
symmetry aml = alm and bjk = bkj and linear homogeneity in w (
j
bj =1, 
j
bjk =0  k, 

j
amj =0 m, 
j
bjt =0). This leads us to normalize profit and input prices by the 
price of capital before taking logarithms.
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Next, to model the inefficiency term, we hypothesize that the determinants of 
bank inefficiency are deregulation, size and nature of ownership. Hence we have the 
vector itZ   = (T, DEREG, SIZE, PUB, PVT, NEWPVT, Interaction terms), where T is the 
trend which accounts for change in inefficiency over time. DEREG is a deregulation 
dummy taking the value one for years 1993 and above, and zero otherwise.
13
 SIZE is 
taken to be log of total assets. PUB, PVT and NEWPVT are ownership dummies that 
take the value one if a bank belongs to the public sector, private sector and new private 
sector respectively, and zero otherwise.
14
 
 
5. Profit Efficiency Results 
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We first present the estimates of the frontier parameters (see Table 2) and then discuss 
our results. Since the main focus of the analysis is on inefficiency and its determinants, 
we do not discuss the estimated coefficients of the profit function. At the outset it is 
important to verify whether inefficiency effects are at all present or if they have simpler 
distributions, which would indicate whether the stochastic frontier model framework is 
necessary for our analysis. We can do this by first performing a composite test of   = 0  
= …. = 13  = 0. The test uses a generalized likelihood ratio (LR) which follows a mixed 
chi-squared distribution (Coelli and Battese, 1996). In our case the null hypothesis is 
rejected (LR test statistic of the one-sided error is 705.93 which is greater than the 
appropriate mixed-Chi square statistic available in Table 1 of Kodde and Palm, 1986). 
Hence simple regression estimation would not be adequate and stochastic frontier 
estimation is necessary. We also test whether the inefficiency effects have a simpler 
distribution such as half-normal with zero mean. We can do this by testing for 0  = …. = 
13  = 0. Again, a generalized LR test rejects the null hypothesis (LR test statistic is 
625.12 which is greater than the appropriate mixed-Chi square statistic available in Table 
1 of Kodde and Palm, 1986). Hence our tests suggest that bank specific inefficiency 
effects are present and that such inefficiencies are better modeled within a stochastic 
frontier framework. 
Moving on to the behavior of inefficiency, we focus on the last three columns of 
Table 2 which provide the estimated inefficiency model. The coefficient of T indicates 
the time behavior of inefficiency prior to deregulation (i.e. when DEREG = 0) and is not 
significant at the 5 % level. This suggests that profit efficiency of the banking industry 
did not exhibit any significant trend prior to deregulation. However, to discern the 
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movement of profit efficiency over the entire sample period, we estimated a reduced 
inefficiency model with T as the only regressor (see Table 3 for the reduced inefficiency 
models). The positive and significant coefficient of T in the reduced model suggests that 
the average profit efficiency of the industry did decline over the entire period. 
Deregulation did not stop this decline on an average as is indicated by the insignificant 
coefficient of DEREG*T in a reduced inefficiency model with only T and DEREG*T as 
regressors (see Table 3). 
Turning to the role of ownership, we see from Table 2 that the coefficients of the 
public and private dummies, per se, have statistically significant coefficients. Thus, prior 
to deregulation (i.e. when DEREG = 0), ownership was important in determining profit 
efficiency. In fact, the relative values of the coefficients of these dummies show that, 
public and private banks were the most efficient, followed by foreign banks. For the 
entire sample period, public banks were more profit efficient than private, new private 
and foreign banks in this order, as shown by the relative values of the coefficients of the 
ownership dummies in a reduced inefficiency model with only the ownership dummies as 
regressors (see Table 3). 
Having separately studied the roles of deregulation and ownership in affecting 
profit efficiency, we now analyze the presence of ownership effects in the impact of 
deregulation on performance. In other words, we investigate whether the impact of 
deregulation on performance is different across ownership groups. This can be studied in 
terms of the full model whose estimates are presented in Table 2. We observe that all 
those terms that contain interaction between deregulation and ownership, viz. 
DEREG*PUB, DEREG*PVT, DEREG*T*PUB and DEREG*T*PVT, have statistically 
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significant coefficients. This indicates the presence of ownership effects in deregulation. 
The impact of deregulation on profit efficiency of any bank group can be discerned by 
collecting all the relevant terms involving the DEREG variable. For example, the impact 
of deregulation on profit efficiency of public banks alone can be derived from the 
coefficients of DEREG, DEREG*T, DEREG*PUB and DEREG*T*PUB. The marginal 
impact of deregulation on public banks (i.e. the first derivative of inefficiency with 
respect to DEREG, such that only PUB = 1) is therefore given by the sum of -0.562, 
0.073 multiplied by T, -1.571 multiplied by 1, and 0.153 multiplied by T and 1. This is 
positive for T equal to 10 and above (T takes the value of 10 in the year 1995), 
suggesting that subsequent to deregulation, profit efficiency of public banks did decline. 
The impact of deregulation on the other groups were similarly calculated, and the 
results for foreign banks were similar to those for public banks, viz. that profit efficiency 
declined subsequent to deregulation, but the profit efficiency of private banks increased 
after deregulation. The next question we turn to is the role of size in efficiency. We 
observe that the coefficient of the size variable is negative and statistically significant 
thereby implying that profit efficiency is higher for bigger banks. 
Next we estimate bank-wise efficiency for each year. From this, we compute the 
group-wise efficiency estimates for each year by taking a simple mean over the 
constituent banks of each group.
15
 These mean efficiencies are reported in Table 4. From 
the mean values, we notice that in the years prior to 1993, public banks performed better 
than the public, new private and foreign banks in that order. T-tests of mean differences 
of the profit efficiencies confirm this finding at 1 % level of significance.
16
 However, 
subsequent to deregulation, t-tests of mean differences suggest that there was no 
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significant difference in the profit efficiency of public and private banks. In other words, 
private banks took the lead in improving the quality of their services and therefore were 
able to close their gap in profit efficiency with public banks. Public banks, however also 
improved their profit efficiency after 2001 which indicates that they were late in picking 
up the benefits of deregulation. However, public banks had much higher profit efficiency 
than foreign banks throughout the sample period, as confirmed by t-tests of mean 
differences in both the sub-periods of pre and post-deregulation. 
The above results can be summarized and interpreted as follows. First, the fall in 
profit efficiency over time suggests that, compared to those banks that comprised the 
frontier, profits of the other banks declined. This implies that the intensified competition 
in the banking industry had the expected effect of reducing profits. While some banks 
comprising the frontier managed to take the lead in delivering innovative products of 
superior quality as a response to the increasing competition, most banks took time to 
adjust to the required reorientation in their business. So most banks could not produce the 
optimal output combination so as to reap maximum profits and hence moved away from 
the profit frontier. In fact a similar decline in profit efficiency has also been reported in 
the case of Japanese banks (Maudos and Pastor, 2001) and Spanish banks (Maudos and 
Pastor, 2003). 
Second, while public banks were more profit efficient than private banks prior to 
deregulation, their difference was insignificant after deregulation. Before the banking 
sector reforms, public banks were heavily protected by the government whereas the 
private banks had to face many restrictions in their operations. This may have led the 
public banks to be more profit efficient than the private banks. However, in the post-
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deregulation regime, a level playing field was created for all bank groups. Private banks 
were able to improve the quality of their products and services better than the public 
banks (i.e. the „quality hypothesis‟). Private banks took the lead in investing in a lot of 
new areas like setting up ALPM (Advanced Ledger Posting Machine) branches, up-
gradation of technology, flexible banking hours, online banking etc., which earned them 
higher revenues that more than made up for the additional costs incurred. The response of 
public banks was delayed, but they did follow up with superior technology and better 
quality of services as well, which allowed them to maintain high profit efficiency levels, 
which was in fact much higher than that of foreign banks. 
Foreign banks remained the most inefficient group on the profit front. This has 
also been observed for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe where 
foreign banks were found to be less profit efficient than domestically owned private 
banks and state-owned banks (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002). Lower profit efficiency of 
foreign banks in India may be a reflection of their high cost practices. Foreign banks 
incur a lot of expenditure on high wages of employees and on costly real estate. Also, 
practices like offering free remittance facilities to top-end customers or pushing cheap 
retail loans in order to capture retail markets may have adversely affected their profit 
efficiency. On the deposit side, foreign banks have higher proportion of fixed deposits as 
compared with domestic banks. This entails higher interest expenditure due to higher 
interest rates and leads to lower spreads. Moreover, being unlisted in India and being a 
small fraction of their parent entities, they may not be under pressure to perform as much 
as the domestic banks. 
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Finally, size appears to positively impact profit efficiency. This suggests that big 
banks are able to contain costs owing to scale economies and hence exhibit higher profit 
efficiency. However it may be noted that public banks are generally the bigger banks in 
India. In fact, the correlation coefficient of PUB and SIZE dummies turned out to be 
greater than 0.6 in every year, although it has been gradually declining over the years.
17
 
Hence it may also be possible that the higher profit efficiency of the public banks is being 
partly picked up as a size effect. This finding of a positive impact of size on efficiency is 
different from that of Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) who observed that for Indian banks 
during the period 1996 to 2001, size seem to have had a negative impact on accounting 
indicators of performance. Previous studies on profit efficiency provide mixed evidence 
on the relation between size and efficiency (e.g. while Berger and Mester, 1997 and 
Williams and Gardener, 2003 find negative relation, Kasman and Yildirim, 2006 find no 
relation). 
So far we have analyzed profit efficiency. However efficiency and productivity 
are different concepts and a low value of one does not necessarily imply a low value of 
the other. For example, productivity measured by TFP can be shown to consist of scale 
effects and technical change effects, in addition to efficiency growth. Hence, a bank with 
low efficiency could be reaping scale economies or benefiting from technical progress so 
as to have a high productivity growth. Thus any study of performance would remain 
incomplete without an analysis of productivity growth. We turn to this issue in the next 
section. 
 
6. Profit Productivity Results 
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Productivity or TFP of any firm is commonly defined as a measure of output produced 
relative to input usage. Change in efficiency, as was estimated in the previous section, 
can be shown to be one of the components of TFP growth. Based on the stochastic 
frontier (of production, cost or standard profit), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provided a 
decomposition of TFP growth as the sum of a technical change component, a scale 
economy component and an efficiency growth component. 
However, in the case of the alternative profit specification, scale effects cannot be 
measured, due to the absence of Shephard-Hotelling derivative properties (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000). Thus, a measure of TFP cannot be estimated based on the alternative 
profit frontier due to absence of the scale component. The components of technical 
change (capturing shifts in the alternative profit frontier) and efficiency growth can 
however be estimated from the alternative profit frontier. Thus, based on the estimated 
alternative profit frontier, we can estimate two out of the three components of TFP 
growth to arrive at a measure which represents profit productivity. 
Such a measure of profit productivity would give us a more comprehensive 
measure of profit performance of banks than simply profit efficiency. Profit productivity 
measures how productive a bank is in increasing its profit using the employed resources. 
The literature provides a variety of similar profit performance measures based on the 
alternative profit frontier. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) calculated a „profit index‟ based 
on the alternative profit function, as the ratio of current profit to the previous period‟s 
profit. Then they decomposed it into effects of „technical change‟ (the extent of shift of 
the alternative profit function) and „business environment‟ (exogenous variables specified 
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in the alternative profit function). They did not have a profit efficiency component in the 
„profit index‟ since their alternative profit function did not consider an inefficiency term. 
Berger and Mester (2003) defined a measure of profit productivity, based on the 
alternative profit frontier, which reflects the proportional change in profit over time for a 
given set of „business conditions‟ (i.e. exogenous variables specified in the alternative 
profit frontier). First, they defined change in profit as the product of three components, 
viz. contributions from change in best practice (or technical change), change in efficiency 
and change in business environment. Then they defined profit productivity as the product 
of the first two factors. In logarithm terms, this is the same as defining profit productivity 
growth as a sum of technical progress and efficiency growth. Kumbhakar et al. (2001) 
used a profit frontier to estimate productivity growth as “the sum of technical change 
(shifts in the profit frontier through time, ceteris paribus and change in profit technical 
efficiency components”. Drawing from these studies, in order to study the profit 
performance of Indian banks, we define profit productivity growth 
as,
t
U
tWYRODP


 ),,(  ,18 which is then rewritten as, 
21  RODPRODPRODP
  . 
1RODP
  gives the technical progress component (which shows the extent to 
which the profit frontier has shifted up, resulting from improved techniques or regulatory 
innovations)
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 and 2RODP
  gives the profit efficiency growth component (which 
indicates the proximity of banks to the profit frontier) of profit productivity growth. Thus, 
profit productivity growth estimates the overall profit performance of a bank emanating 
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from a shift in the profit frontier as well as a movement towards or away from the profit 
frontier. 
In order to study the behaviour of profit productivity, we construct indices of each 
component of profit productivity, i.e. iPROD  (t) = iPROD  (t-1)[1+ iRODP 
 (t)], 
and it is set at 100 for the initial year. The mean iRODP 
  are calculated for each bank 
group for each year. Based on these means, iPROD are computed for each bank group 
for each year. PROD  is computed in a similar fashion.20 
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 5 reports the movement of mean 1PROD  which gives 
the technical change component. It is evident that there has been a fall in the technical 
progress component of profit productivity which is associated with a downward shift in 
the profit frontier. We have argued earlier that this is expected in an industry moving 
from a regulated to a deregulated regime where greater intensity of competition would 
drive down profits. Moreover, entry would further intensify the competition, contributing 
to the squeeze in profits which once again gets manifested in the technological 
deterioration of the profit function. In other words, during a process of deregulation, the 
share of each firm in industry profits declines both because more intense competition 
leads to lower prices and therefore lower profits and because, subsequent to entry, there 
are more number of firms to share the total pie. 
The higher 1PROD  values of public banks suggest that this group did better in 
arresting the decline compared to foreign and private banks (t-tests of mean differences 
confirmed this). Although the profit productivity levels for new private banks are not 
strictly comparable with the other groups (since the initial year for this group is 1996), we 
can see from Table 6 that 1PROD  declined over time even for this group. We also 
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recomputed the indices for all bank groups by taking the base at 1996 so that we could 
get comparable values for all bank groups with new private banks during the period 
1996-2005. This showed that the new private banks performed almost similar to the 
public banks during this period.
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Columns 5 to 7 of Table 5 reports the movement of mean 2PROD  which gives 
the efficiency growth component of profit productivity. While the previous section 
documented the movement of profit efficiency levels, 2PROD  represents a productivity 
index based on the growth of profit efficiency. Note that although efficiency levels of 
foreign banks were relatively low, in terms of efficiency growth they have been 
performing better than the other groups. In fact, t-tests of mean differences of the 
2PROD  values suggested that foreign and private banks have performed better than the 
public banks in terms of efficiency growth. Therefore foreign banks, in spite of their low 
profit efficiency levels, appear to be rapidly improving their performance as compared 
with private and public banks. New private banks, even though not comparable with the 
other groups in terms of the profit productivity levels, exhibited rapid efficiency growth 
as well (see Table 6). When we recomputed the indices for all groups taking the base at 
1996, new private banks performed the best in terms of efficiency growth. 
The PROD  index is reported in columns 8 to 10 of Table 5. This gives the 
overall performance of banks in terms of profit productivity. From the reported values, 
we discern two features. Firstly, profit productivity has fallen over the years for all bank 
groups. This, as we have already discussed, is expected in a deregulating industry where 
severe competition from incumbents as well as entrants would lead to a fall in profits. 
Secondly, foreign banks appear to have performed better than the public and private 
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banks in terms of profit productivity. T-tests of mean differences in PROD  indicated 
that foreign banks performed better than the other groups in both the pre and post-
deregulation regimes. On the other hand, while public banks had higher profit 
productivity than the private banks in the pre-deregulation regime, the difference was 
statistically insignificant in the post-deregulation period. 
Foreign banks, through the use of innovative revenue generating strategies, appear 
to have arrested their decline in profit productivity after deregulation better than the other 
groups. As in the case of efficiency, private banks were able to close their gap in 
productivity with public banks by taking advantage of the deregulation process. Although 
the profit productivity levels of new private banks are non-comparable with the other 
groups, we observe the same falling trend in PROD  for this group as well (see Table 
6). Taking recomputed indices with base year as 1996 for all groups, new private banks 
turned out to be the best performers. 
 
7. Comparison of Profit Results with Existing Evidence 
It is useful at this point to compare our results based on the profit function with the 
existing evidence based on cost function. International evidence gives conflicting 
conclusions based on a comparison of the cost and profit approaches. To give a few 
examples, Berger and Mester (2003) report substantial fall in cost productivity but rise in 
profit productivity for US banks. This is attributed to banks providing additional or 
higher quality of services that raised costs but also raised revenues more than the increase 
in costs. On the other hand, Maudos and Pastor (2003) report a rise in cost efficiency and 
fall in profit efficiency in the Spanish banking sector. This finding is attributed to 
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increasing competitive pressure in the Spanish banking sector. Cebenoyan, Cooperman 
and Register (2000) find a rise in cost efficiency but no significant rise in profit 
efficiency of thrift institutions in USA. They assert that this is an expected result given 
that managers have greater control over internal operations than over market conditions. 
Turning to the Indian evidence, while Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b) report that 
cost efficiency has increased during 1986 to 2000, in this paper we find that profit 
efficiency has declined during this period and after. In fact, this is in line with the results 
of Koeva (2003) who, using regression analysis with financial variables of Indian banks, 
concluded that during the period 1992 to 2001, both intermediation costs and profitability 
have come down. Our results of declining profit efficiency are also in line with those of 
Maudos and Pastor (2001) for Japanese banks and Maudos and Pastor (2003) for Spanish 
banks. 
As regards ownership, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003b) concluded that private 
banks are more cost efficient than public banks. However we find public banks to be 
more profit efficient than private banks prior to deregulation and no significant difference 
in the efficiencies after deregulation. New private banks, starting from low levels of 
profit efficiency, demonstrated rapid growth and foreign banks exhibited the lowest profit 
efficiency.
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Comparison of our profit productivity results with existing evidence on TFP and 
cost efficiency confirms the „quality hypothesis‟ i.e. conflicting performances of banks in 
terms of cost and profit based measures. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003a) reported a rise in 
TFP (based on the cost function) over the period 1986 to 1997. They concluded that 
private banks had a higher level of TFP as compared with public banks. On the other 
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hand, our results reveal that profit productivity has declined for all bank groups over the 
period under study. Foreign banks have performed the best in terms of profit productivity, 
ahead of public banks that in turn did better than private banks at least in the pre-
deregulation period. 
In sum, the trend and rankings get reversed to a large extent, when we compare 
performance of Indian banks in terms of cost and profit based measures. While in a 
developed and completely deregulated banking industry like in the USA, profit 
productivity has increased and cost productivity has declined due to banks investing 
heavily in improving quality (Berger and Mester, 2003), it is not surprising to find that in 
a deregulating system such as in India, cost performance improved due to reduction in 
intermediation costs while profit performance declined due to the effect of competition. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper studied efficiency and productivity of scheduled commercial banks in India 
during the period 1986 to 2005 using a stochastic (alternative) profit frontier. Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis gave us estimates of inefficiency and its determinants. Then, using the 
parameter and efficiency estimates from the frontier, a measure of profit productivity and 
its components were computed. We observed that there are profit inefficiencies in Indian 
banking and profit efficiency as well as profit productivity decreased over time. Although 
public banks had higher profit efficiency and profit productivity than private banks in the 
pre-deregulation period, the difference was insignificant after deregulation. Foreign 
banks outperformed all other bank groups in terms of profit productivity as well as its 
components. We interpreted the fall in profit efficiency and profit productivity over time 
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as a consequence of increased competition in the industry. In this sense, the deregulation 
policy seems to have achieved the desired results of infusing competition in the banking 
industry. This should encourage the regulator to remove the remaining policy hindrances 
to entry and encourage greater competition. Therefore, the recent drawing of a road-map 
for foreign bank entry especially in light of WTO commitments augurs well for the 
performance of Indian banking. 
The adoption of a profit maximization hypothesis in the paper may be questioned 
on the grounds that in reality some banks may maximize profits while others may 
minimize costs. In the absence of a mixing model that can incorporate both hypotheses 
simultaneously, we have tried to complement the existing cost based evidence with our 
results based on a profit maximization hypothesis. Admittedly, it would be even more 
interesting to study performance in a framework where banks with different objectives 
can be identified and the difference accounted for in the performance measurement. We 
leave this for our future research. 
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Footnotes: 
1. Berger and Humphrey (1997) documented a country-wise and methodology-wise 
review of studies on bank efficiency. More recently, Alam (2001) and Berger and 
Mester (2003) provided updated reviews. 
2. To cite a few, Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar (1997) estimated 
TFP growth till 1991; Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) examined 
efficiency till 1992; Saha and Ravisankar (2000) studied performance from 1992 
to 1995; Sathye (2003) analyzed performance only for 1998. 
3. Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) examined financial ratios for 1994 and 1995. 
4. Adoption of technology in the form of computerization, ATMs, smart cards etc. is 
expected to have saved costs for Indian banks. 
5. The other frontier methodology is Data Envelopment Analysis which is a non-
parametric technique that does not allow for the error which is expected to be 
present in banking data. 
6. Kumbhakar (2006) suggests that duality results are not applicable in case of the 
alternative profit function and hence the corresponding profit efficiency cannot be 
related to technical inefficiency based on production technology. However it is 
still possible to estimate profit loss due to technical inefficiency or what is 
referred to as profit inefficiency. 
7. Berger and Mester (1997) cited four cases when alternative profit maximization 
may be a preferred approach. These are when (i) there are unmeasured changes in 
the quality of output and banks receive higher revenues that compensate for their 
extra costs of producing high quality output („quality hypothesis‟); (ii) output is 
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not variable; (iii) banks have some market power over the prices of their outputs; 
and (iv) output prices are difficult to measure. 
8. Most studies on Indian banks have used this approach (see Bhattacharyya, 
Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1997; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003a, 2003b). 
The value added approach also appears to be intuitively more appropriate for 
Indian banks for whom deposit mobilization is a key objective. Moreover, 
considering deposits as output takes into account the quality of services provided 
by a bank. 
9. Most of the Indian studies in banking have employed the number of branches as 
an output variable (Subrahmanyam, 1993; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003a, 2003b; 
Sensarma, 2006). 
10. Note that to handle negative values, the dependent variable is taken as ln [  + 
| |min +1], where | |min indicates the absolute value of the minimum value of 
over all banks. Thus, the constant | |min +1 is added to every firm's profit so that 
the natural log is taken of a positive number, since minimum profits are typically 
negative. Thus for the firm with the lowest value of  , the dependent variable 
will be ln [1]=0. 
11. In our set of 83 banks, none of the foreign banks that entered the industry after 
entry deregulation could be included because of considerations of data availability. 
12. According to Berger and Mester (2003), while this normalization not always 
necessary for the alternative profit function, but it is done to enable comparison 
with results from studies based on cost frontier. In fact, this approach has been 
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followed by other studies that estimate the alternative profit function (Casu and 
Girardone, 2004; Williams and Gardener, 2003). 
13. The year 1993 was selected as the deregulation year because it yielded the 
maximum value of likelihood function compared to the other years and also the 
plot of inefficiencies without any deregulation dummy showed the sharpest kink 
at 1993. This is expected because implementation of the recommendations of the 
first Narasimham Committee started in January 1992 (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 
2003b). 
14.  The only other sector is foreign, which becomes the base for interpreting the 
ownership dummies. 
15. Weighted means do not change the results qualitatively. 
16. Results from the t-tests are not reported to save space. These results are consistent 
with the relative values of the group dummy coefficients in the reduced 
inefficiency model. 
17. This indicates that while public banks have always been the bigger banks, but 
their private counterparts are also gradually expanding in size over the years. 
18. Higher inefficiency growth would get reflected in lower productivity; hence the 
second term has a negative sign in the productivity decomposition expression. 
19. In this sense, this component has been referred to as the contribution of change in 
best practice by Berger and Mester (2003). However we follow the terminology 
of Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and use the term „technical progress‟. 
20. Since the initial value of the productivity indices are set at 100 for all groups, here 
we miss out the difference in their initial levels which we were able to analyze 
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from the efficiency estimates. However, here the indices can suggest, based on the 
growth rates of each component of productivity, how the bank groups corrected or 
worsened their performance. 
21. The results with the base of all groups set at 1996 are not reported to save space. 
22. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003a, b) did not have new private or foreign banks in 
their data sets. 
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Table 1: Key Indicators Of Indian Banking: Group-Wise Means 
Variable 1986 1990 1996 2000 2005 
Profits (Rs. millions)           
Public banks 0.884 1.709 -1.142 12.377 30.301 
Private banks 0.062 0.143 1.292 1.808 1.076 
Foreign banks 0.421 1.399 2.520 1.483 20.587 
New private banks . . 1.537 4.643 35.034 
Deposits (Rs. millions)           
Public banks 703.430 1015.920 1206.230 1709.140 3004.280 
Private banks 37.020 50.570 106.930 181.890 393.850 
Foreign banks 33.860 65.890 110.560 76.760 4.040 
New private banks . . 54.970 381.390 1994.920 
Investments (Rs. millions)           
Public banks 209.985 342.145 502.059 807.107 1336.370 
Private banks 11.210 16.617 35.478 74.308 152.140 
Foreign banks 10.018 20.259 40.178 46.162 375.930 
New private banks . . 16.194 192.067 977.660 
Advances (Rs. Millions)           
Public banks 420.582 41.109 640.556 852.360 1619.220 
Private banks 20.105 649.139 61.714 91.460 231.550 
Foreign banks 24.680 28.873 80.051 55.425 695.010 
New private banks . . 45.278 181.013 1554.250 
Branches           
Public banks 13133.300 15152.600 16374.400 17142.600 18082.600 
Private banks 1590.500 1642.200 1816.100 1919.200 2722.500 
Foreign banks 80.000 71.100 66.500 42.400 277.500 
New private banks . . 91.100 575.000 2836.000 
Employees           
Public banks 289768.500 315703.700 331440.400 323766.700 276389.300 
Private banks 19791.400 21992.600 24293.000 24718.300 30971.300 
Foreign banks 6616.300 6443.200 5803.000 3230.200 21650.000 
New private banks . . 793.875 7938.800 70864.000 
Fixed Assets           
Public banks 4.750 6.427 20.333 24.258 25.129 
Private banks 0.306 0.360 3.321 4.126 5.408 
Foreign banks 0.619 1.101 5.435 3.743 18.049 
New private banks . . 3.732 17.843 61.900 
Note: . for new private banks prior to their entry. All rupee figures are at 1993-1994 prices. The 
exchange rate in 2005 was USD1=Rs.44.10. 
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Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Stochastic Profit Frontier based on Panel 
Data for Banks for Years 1986 to 2005 
Beta        Estimate        t-ratio     Delta       Estimate        t-ratio  
CONST    1.451 8.662    CONST    1.415 8.780 
FD   0.669 5.124    T    0.017 0.772 
SD   -0.449 -6.778    DEREG    -0.562 -2.207 
CD   -0.232 -2.782    SIZE     -0.789 -28.956 
INV  0.150 1.262    PUB  -1.804 -10.841 
ADV  -0.254 -2.012    PVT  -2.789 -10.86 
B    -0.111 -1.765    NEWPVT   -1.683 -2.145 
W    -1.282 -38.257    DEREG*T  0.073 2.714 
T    0.101 6.480    DEREG*PUB -1.571 -5.428 
FD2  -0.024 -1.221    DEREG*PVT -2.226 -4.58 
SD2  -0.020 -3.177    DEREG*NEWPVT -1.683 -2.145 
CD2  0.001 0.003    DEREG*T*PUB 0.153 6.614 
INV2     -0.025 -1.961    DEREG*T*PVT 0.178 5.254 
ADV2     -0.030 -1.567    DEREG*T*NEWPVT 0.021 0.451 
B2   -0.030 -4.554                      
W2   -0.125 -51.279                      
T2   0.001 0.788                      
FD*SD    -0.003 -0.213                      
FD*CD    0.019 0.848    Sigma-squared    0.483 21.217 
FD*INV   0.050 1.608    Gamma    0.936 140.547 
FD*ADV   0.026 0.835                      
FD*B     -0.032 -1.928    Log Likelihood   -365.684         
FD*W     0.064 5.108 LR Test for   = i  = 0,  i  705.93*     
FD*T     -0.003 -0.676 LR Test for i  = 0,  i  625.12*        
SD*CD    0.005 0.517                      
SD*INV   0.013 0.848                      
SD*ADV   0.045 3.599                      
SD*B     -0.018 -1.623                      
SD*W     -0.037 -7.295                      
SD*T     0.008 2.733                      
CD*INV   -0.044 -1.767                      
CD*ADV   -0.088 -3.846                      
CD*B     0.083 6.347                      
CD*W     0.010 1.649                      
CD*T     0.009 2.652                      
INV*ADV  0.056 2.145                      
INV*B    0.046 2.884                      
INV*W    0.041 3.492                      
INV*T    -0.015 -2.811                      
ADV*B    -0.004 -0.228                      
ADV*W    -0.034 -3.309                      
ADV*T    -0.004 -0.684                      
B*W  -0.048 -9.235                      
B*T  0.001 0.179    Number of Banks        83       
W*T  0.013 9.702     Number of Observations   1362     
Notes: FD = Fixed Deposits, SD = Saving Deposits, CD = Current Deposits, INV = Investments, ADV = 
Loans and Advances, B = Number of branches, W = Wage-rental ratio, T = Time trend (Year), * denotes 
significance (Kodde and Palm, 1986)  
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Table 3: Estimated Reduced Profit Inefficiency Model 
Delta Estimate t-ratio 
Trend behaviour     
CONST -3.608 -17.015 
T 0.398 18.568 
Deregulation 
effect     
CONST -3.661 -2.291 
T 0.396 18.357 
DEREG*T 0.059 0.631 
Ownership effect     
CONST 1.059 11.653 
PUB -4.344 -7.815 
PVT -3.827 -8.898 
NEWPVT -1.421 -8.539 
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Table 4: Mean Profit Efficiency by Bank Groups 
Year  Public Private Foreign New Private 
1986 91.15 85.07 42.40 . 
1987 91.09 84.91 42.21 . 
1988 91.83 86.92 43.93 . 
1989 84.98 79.91 39.05 . 
1990 89.88 85.51 46.11 . 
1991 90.69 85.79 49.60 . 
1992 90.92 86.92 58.03 . 
1993 87.11 88.11 61.45 . 
1994 87.87 91.24 61.63 . 
1995 91.11 90.76 59.99 . 
1996 86.76 88.97 56.45 83.55 
1997 89.75 83.87 43.79 82.69 
1998 90.13 86.65 37.67 82.99 
1999 88.18 81.90 37.83 82.91 
2000 87.59 86.10 39.83 91.53 
2001 77.80 85.83 36.13 90.29 
2002 83.32 83.95 33.98 89.05 
2003 82.56 78.05 39.40 85.47 
2004 85.58 82.55 62.75 90.17 
2005 84.45 81.07 64.34 81.49 
Note: . for new private banks prior to their entry. 
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Table 5: Indices of Productivity Components and Profit Productivity 
  Technical Change Component Efficiency Component Profit Productivity 
Year Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign Public Private Foreign 
1986 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1987 92.12 99.99 92.11 90.74 99.48 90.60 91.22 99.49 93.69 
1988 85.00 100.80 85.73 82.36 104.18 86.51 83.31 101.20 89.97 
1989 78.47 93.41 72.87 74.80 95.68 71.52 76.24 91.18 73.23 
1990 72.50 98.38 71.20 67.90 102.10 69.71 69.78 104.61 81.51 
1991 66.96 99.19 66.34 61.63 102.47 63.54 64.09 111.43 82.12 
1992 61.95 99.45 61.56 55.95 103.80 58.50 58.87 135.68 93.30 
1993 57.35 94.78 54.10 50.86 105.42 54.10 54.22 144.09 91.71 
1994 53.14 95.47 50.52 46.31 110.22 51.72 50.09 153.43 90.66 
1995 49.18 99.45 48.86 42.23 109.64 46.89 46.16 149.17 81.03 
1996 45.54 93.71 42.42 38.53 107.66 41.93 42.50 134.28 66.53 
1997 42.18 97.58 41.05 35.28 98.10 38.56 38.97 144.90 63.55 
1998 39.12 97.86 38.18 32.40 96.73 35.13 35.70 130.98 50.16 
1999 36.31 95.66 34.58 29.76 87.67 31.75 32.72 126.05 46.76 
2000 33.75 94.91 31.87 27.37 91.09 30.83 29.94 115.60 40.10 
2001 31.40 83.42 25.79 25.18 96.50 30.20 27.44 118.67 39.53 
2002 29.23 89.00 25.74 23.19 94.16 26.76 25.13 109.48 35.81 
2003 27.26 87.81 23.66 21.36 85.11 23.80 23.01 120.71 35.98 
2004 25.70 91.04 23.15 19.85 92.18 24.09 21.35 94.83 24.38 
2005 24.23 89.44 21.17 18.41 89.71 22.52 19.78 95.83 22.92 
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Table 6: Indices of Productivity Components and Profit Productivity for New 
Private Banks 
 
Year Technical Change Component Efficiency Component Profit Productivity 
1996 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1997 92.73 104.14 96.97 
1998 86.31 101.71 88.05 
1999 80.45 102.12 82.42 
2000 75.24 115.44 87.78 
2001 70.44 113.33 80.71 
2002 65.89 111.79 73.81 
2003 61.78 104.81 63.49 
2004 57.82 110.90 61.54 
2005 54.21 93.96 57.98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
